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THE LAW in relation to therapeutic abortion and termination of pregnancy is
based on statute and case law. It is true that case law stems from statute law.
The relevant legislation at present is contained in sections 58 and 59 of The Offences
against the Person Act, 1861(1), and in section 1 of The Infant Life (Preservation)
Act 1929(2).
The appropriate sections of the Oifences Against the Person Act, 1861 are as
follows:
SECrION 58-
Every woman, being with child, who with intent to procure her own miscarriage, shall
unlawfully administer to herself any poison or other noxious thing or shall unlawfully
use any instrument or other means whatsoever, with the like intent and whosoever
with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman whether she be or be not with
child, shall unlawfully administer to her or cause to be taken by her any poison or
other noxious thing or shall unlawfully use any instrument or other means whatsoever
with the like intent shall be guilty of felony and being convicted thereof shall be
liable . . . to be kept in penal servitude for life.
SECrION 59-
Whosoever shall unlawfully supply or procure any poison or other noxious thing or
any instrument or thing whatsoever, knowing that the same is intended to be unlaw-
fully used or employed with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman, whether
she be or be not with child, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour and being convicted
thereof shall be liable . . . to be kept in penal servitude.
The relevant sections of The Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 read as follows:
SECriON 1-
(1) Subject as hereinafter in this sub-section provided, any person who, with intent
to destroy the life of a child capable of being born alive, by any wilful act cause
a child to die before it has an existence independent of its mother, shall be guilty
of felony, to wit of child destruction and shall be liable on conviction thereof on
indictment to penal servitude for life.
Provided that no person shall be found guilty of an offence under this section
unless it is proved that the act which caused the death of the child was not done
in good faith for the purpose only of preserving the life of the mother.
(2) For the purposes of this act, evidence that a woman had at any material time been
pregnant for a period of 28 weeks or more shall be prima facie proof that she was
at that time pregnant of a child capable of being born alive.
Case law consists of several judgments over the last 30 years, the best known of
which is R. v. Bourne(3) where Mr. Bourne, a well known gynaecological surgeon
was charged with unlawfully terminating a pregnancy. The meaning of the word
"unlawfully" in section 58 of the Act quoted is an important feature of these cases.
In the Bourne case, the direction to the jury emphasised that the prosecution had
the duty of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the operation of terminating the
pregnancy was not performed in good faith for the purpose only of preserving the
life of the patient.
It is reasonable for the lay mind to assume from various judgments in the Courts
111that this question of good faith is of paramount importance. In some respects, it is
unusual that none of the cases of criminal abortion with the ensuing judgments
dealing with the aspect of good faith has found its way to the court of appeal. In
one judgment, it was ruled by the judge that as far as the termination of pregnancy
in good faith on medical grounds was concerned, the range of the danger to the life
of the mother would not be examined too closely (R. v. Bergmann and Fer-
guson(4)). This question of good faith was dealt with in R. v. Newton and
Stungo(5) by the judge, who held that a termination of pregnancy was unlawful
unless carried out "in good faith for the purposes of preserving the life or health
of the woman, and when I say health I mean not only her physical health but also
her mental health".
Statute law has no reference to this aspect of good faith. An interesting com-
mentary in this connection is included in the Report of the Inter-departmental
Committee on Abortion 1939(6). One of the recommendations was that "the law
should be amended to make it unmistakably clear that a medical practitioner is
acting legally when, in good faith, he procures the abortion of a pregnant woman
in circumstances which satisfy him that continuance of the pregnancy is likely to
endanger her life or seriously to impair her health". In fact this recommendation
has not found its way into any statute.
The question of "good faith" was mentioned by the judge in the Bourne case.
His ipsissima verba in his direction to the jury were "the question you have got to
determine is whether the Crown has proved to your satisfaction beyond reasonable
doubt that the act which Mr. Bourne admittedly did was not done in good faith for
the purpose only of preserving the life of the girl. If the Crown has failed to satisfy
you of that, Mr. Bourne is entitled, by the law of the land, to a verdict of
acquittal. On the other hand, if you are satisfied beyond all real doubt that Mr.
Bourne did not do it in good faith for the purpose only of preserving the life of
the girl, your verdict should be a verdict of guilty". Several comments of the judge
in the same case are pertinent and of value in relation to the law as it stands. For
example, the point is made "where the doctor expects, basing his opinion upon
the experience and knowledge of the profession, that the child cannot be delivered
without the death of the mother." In these circumstances, the doctor is entitled
-and indeed it is his duty-to perform the operation with a view to saving the life
of the mother.
In view of what has been stated frequently in discussions on The Medical
Termination of Pregnancy Bill(7), presently under consideration in the House of
Commons, another observation of the learned judge is relevant, "some there may
be, for all I know, who, hold the view that the fact that the woman desires the
operation to be performed is a sufficient justification for it. That is not the law".
He clarifies another point which is obviously one that is pertinent to the discussions
on this new Bill, "on the other hand, no doubt there are people who, from what
are said to be religious reasons object to the operation being performed at all, in
any circumstances. That is not the law either".
At this point, it may help to state the views of the Roman Catholic Church. The
equality of mother and foetus is an authoritative dogma of the Church, "the life of
each is equally sacred", said Pope Pius XI in his encyclical Casti Connubii, "and
no one has the power, not even the public authority, to destroy it".
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R. v. Bourne gave a general outline in his judgment, "the law of this land has
always held human life to be sacred, and the protection that the law gives to human
life it extends also to the unborn child in the womb. The unborn child in the womb
must not be destroyed unless the destruction of that child is for the purpose of
preserving the yet more precious life of the mother". The observations of the
learned judge clarify the existing law on the termination of pregnancy. It is evident
that the law does allow for the termination of pregnancy in certain circumstances.
Danger to life represents a clear indication. But over and above this point, it is
clear also that danger to health or impairment of health whether physical or mental
through the evolution of case law, have come: to be regarded as lawful indications
for the termination of pregnancy. The surgeon is not compelled to, wait until the
patient is obviously about to die before he performs the operation, but it is clear
that if he foresees impairment or danger to physical or mental health, he is entitled
legally, acting in good faith, to perform the operation. Having regard to all these
considerations, the question emerges as to whether any need arises to amend existing
legislation in relation to the termination of pregnancy.
There would appear to be a weakness in existing legislation which apparently
permits the operation of termination of pregnancy to be performed relatively
frequently in one city in the United Kingdom, whereas, in another city in the same
country, this operation is but rarely performed, and this would seem to be an
aspect of the law which requires particular clarification. It is appreciated that
factors other than the interpretation of the law may be involved, but it is obvious
that these do not afford a complete explanation. It is felt that amending legislation,
if such be passed, should allow at least for the conscientious beliefs and the good
faith of the members of the medical profession. There are many gynaecological
surgeons who, for a lifetime, have found that the present terms of the law have
given them all the freedom necessary to pursue their professional activities accord-
ing to the moral and ethical standards of the code of practice of their profession
and who do not see any pressing need to reform the existing law.
In the city of Belfast during the year 1966, 25,000 patients were admitted to
obstetric and gynaecological units and 12 cases of therapeutic abortion were per-
formed. A report of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists states
that "in National Health Service Hospitals, there were approximately 1,600 recorded
therapeutic abortions performed in 1958, and 2,800 in 1962"(8). The Minister of
Health gave the following figures on therapeutic abortion in the N.H.S. hospitals
in England and Wales as follows 1961-2,300; 1962-2,800; 1963-2,600 ;1964-
3,300(9).
It has been stated that one of the reasons "to amend and clarify the law relating
to termination of pregnancy by registered medical practitioners" is to reduce the
number of criminal, illegal or "back-street" abortions performed in Britain. Between
30,000 and 250,000 cases of this type are said to, be performed in Britain annually
(Pearson M(10)). The very nature of this type of crime indicates that it is impossible
to determine the number of such cases. Those surgeons who control gynaecological
units, to which are admitted large numbers of patients suffering from all clinical
types of abortion, find very few cases exhibiting evidence sufficient to justify a
diagnosis of criminal interference.
113In any proposed new legislation, the definition of indications for the legal ter-
mination of pregnancy must surely be drafted with extreme care. There is the
obvious danger on the one hand of opening the legal door too widely and so in-
creasing present abuses, and on the other of framing the law too closely on the
question of indications for such must be sufficiently flexible to keep in line with
advancements in medical science. This view is shared by the British Medical
Association("), the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists(8) and the
Joint Committee of the Law Society and the British Academy of Forensic
Sciences(12).
The original clause 1 of the new Bill, in general, proposed to legalise termination
of pregnancy in cases of physical or mental risk, abnormalities in the child, severe
over-straining of the pregnant woman's capacity as a mother, pregnancy as a result
of rape, and where the mother was defective or became pregnant under the age of
16 years.
Amendments during the Committee stage resulted in the following alterations:
1. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person shall not be guilty of an
offence under the law relating to abortion when a pregnancy is terminated
by a registered medical practitioner if that practitioner and another registered
practitioner are of the opinion formed in good faith.
(i) That the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life
or injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or
the future well being of herself and or the child or her other children.
(ii) In determining whether or not there is such injury to health or well
being an account may be taken of the patients total environment actual
or reasonably foreseeable.
This clause, if approved by Parliament, must be adequate, surely certainly and
without doubt for almost any contingency in which therapeutic abortion is likely
to be considered. It is obvious, however, that interpretation of certain words and
phrases may give rise to difficulty. The amended clause retains that flexibility
necessary for the medical practitioner to come to a correct conclusion, having
regard to all factors involved and the ethos and good faith of the profession.
Further amendments to this clause are likely to be made before the Bill goes to
the House of Lords.
An important consideration in applying the law to the realities of the situation
must be the risks of termination, whatever method be employed. Every gynae-
cological surgeon knows of the trauma and infection which accompany operations
of this type. Not only is a foetus destroyed but trauma is inflicted on the genital
tract, and trauma plus infection may render the patient sterile. Reliable figures are
difficult to obtain. Danish figures(13). for complications of therapeutic abortions
vary from 5 per cent. in the earliest stages of pregnancy when the risk is lowest, to
50 per cent. in cases of hysterotomy and sterilisation. Other figures(14) from the
same country show a lethality risk of 05 per 1,000 for vaginal methods and of 1 3
per 1,000 for abdominal operations. A review of the Japanese experience in
hundreds of thousands of termination of pregnancy makes disquieting reading on
every aspect of the complications of this procedure. For example, two reports
include 336 cases of uterine rupture, while another points to 161 deaths as the
result of induced abortion. Figures(15) from many countries makedisturbing reading.
114Even cursory examination of figures quoted should discourage those who wish to
see the practice of therapeutic abortion extended.
The suggestion in the original Bill that termination of pregnancy should include
as a legal indication "a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer
from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped" is one
which should be resisted to the full. It may have been born out of the dreadful
thalidomide tragedies, but while every sympathy must be felt for those children
who have survived and for their parents, the reality of the situation is that the
diagnosis of foetal abnormality is well-nigh impossible in early pregnancy and
indeed some forms of mental disorder do not manifest themselves till the child is
some months old. Is there any difference in principle between the suggested pro-
cedure and killing the child at birth because of its abnormality? Is there any real
difference between this killing of a child and euthanasia, to which the Church and
the medical profession continue to offer rightful and legitimate resistance? Any
action which was immoral and illegal prior to the passing of a Parliamentary Bill,
becomes legal after the Royal Assent, but surely it does not become moral with
the passing of an Act.
There has been support for the termination of pregnancy in those cases where a
mother has contracted rubella at an early stage of pregnancy. Hill(16) and other
writers have shown a high incidence of the rubella syndrome in the foetus, the
highest being a figure of 50 per cent.(17). But a patient having suffered from rubella
in early pregnancy might well consider that a 50 per cent. incidence of abnormality
insufficient to provide her with grounds for termination of her pregnancy and many
gynaecological surgeons would agree with her views.
Much has been written about the psychiatric indications for abortion. While
there may be psychiatric reasons for this procedure, assessed on complete honesty,
yet much less prominence has been given to the psychic sequelae which may follow
termination of pregnancy. The summary given by Martin Ekblad(18) is interesting.
"The psychically abnormal find it more difficult than the psychically normal to
stand the stress implied in a legal abortion. This means that the greater the
psychiatric indications for legal abortion are, the greater will be the risk of un-
favourable psychic sequelae after the operation".
Another view is expressed by Robert White(19). "An abortion induced under
these circumstances, i.e. circumstances of a properly arranged abortion after
adequate consideration, in an emotionally supportive setting and followed by
enough adequate psychotherapeutic sessions to work through the resultant doubts
and potential guilt probably does not cause serious psychological damage." He
instances the opinions of writers in Denmark and America to support his view.
The decline in population in those countries where legalised abortion is practised
seems to be due more to this than to the practice of contraception. Figures show
that while the number of illegal abortions remains at the same level as formerly,
yet the figure for full-time births has now fallen below that of legally procured
abortion.
There can be no objection to incorporating in the new Bill a clause to demand
the agreement of two or even more registered medical practitioners.
There is danger in a suggestion that legalised abortion should be carried out only
by those surgeons employed in the National Health Service. This may not present
115itself favourably to the medical profession or to the General Medical Council which
controls the admission of medical practitioners to the Medical Register. What is
important is to ensure that there is a proviso in the Bill to the effect that the
operation will be carried out by those with experience and skill.
If control of legalised abortion be required, the notification of each abortion and
of the hospital or other institution where the operation was performed will meet
the case. Difficulty may arise as to the confidentiality in the case of notification,
but this aspect can be covered by a "doctor to doctor" procedure.
One additional danger implicit in the new Bill is the legal risk to the surgeon
who refuses to perform the operation. There is a possibility, probably not in the
near future, but nevertheless a distinct possibility, that he may by his refusal
become legally culpable and, at least, may find himself in the position of having
to defend his actions in the Courts. The Bill now incorporates a clause allowing
for the conscientious views of those, who hold that therapeutic abortion is wrong,
from either a moral or religious point of view, yet it is possible that a medical
practitioner may be debarred for this reason, from obtaining or holding a consultant
post in the National Health Service. It is to be hoped sincerely that discrimination
of this sort will never be permitted.
Must we not hold to the ethos of medicine, in simple language to save life and
certainly not to destroy it? The sanctity of life is paramount.
It is pertinent to recall the views of Doctor F. M. R. Walshe(20) on A.I.D. and
these are "when techniques come into the irresponsible hands of the ethically root-
less, they are a constant threat to both intellectual and ethical values, as we may
see when we gaze around us upon a world in which man is torn and tormented by
the fruits of techniques he has neither the wisdom nor the sense of values to
control. Medicine now is being invaded by this evil, and every thoughtful doctor,
who holds dear the traditions of medicine as a humane and learned profession
must feel called upon to protest in unequivocal language".
These comments should receive the most careful and searching consideration in
the drafting and the examination of the final approval of any Bill relating to the
therapeutic termination of pregnancy.
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